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I. 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-3(2)(j) (1991). 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court act reasonably in denying 
Appellant Roland Kaufmann's ("Kaufmann") Motion to Continue Trial 
filed five days before the scheduled trial date? The standard of 
review on this issue is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion under the particular facts and circumstances of the 
case. Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309, 311 (Utah App. 1992). 
2. Did the district court correctly enter a default 
judgment against Kaufmann because of his failure to appear and 
defend at trial? The standard of review on this issue is 
whether the trial court abused its discretion under the 
particular facts and circumstances of the case. Griffiths v. 
Hammond,- 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
The issue relating to the trial court's denial of 
Kaufmann's Motion for Continuance is determined under Rule 40(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The issue relating to the 
trial court's entrance of a default judgment in favor of Akhavan 
is determined by Rules 55 and 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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IV. 
INTRODUCTION 
Kaufmann filed his appeal asking the court to examine 
two rulings of the district court, namely: whether the court 
abused its discretion in denying his Motion for Continuance and 
entering a default judgment against Kaufmann for failure to 
appear at the trial. The standard for review under both of these 
issues is whether the district court abused its discretion. 
Recognizing this onerous standard, Kaufmann attempts to bootstrap 
his arguments by claiming that he was denied an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether the court could properly exercise 
personal jurisdiction. 
Kaufmann1s attempts to use the issue of personal 
jurisdiction to bolster his claim that the court abused its 
discretion should not be allowed. Kaufmann never raised the 
argument before the district court that denying his request for 
continuance would prevent him from contesting personal 
jurisdiction in an evidentiary hearing. Kaufmann also fails to 
cite to any portion of the record to demonstrate that he 
requested an evidentiary hearing for the determination of 
personal jurisdiction. In fact, the personal jurisdiction issue 
was submitted on the affidavits, memoranda and oral arguments of 
the parties. Kaufmann's claim that the issue of personal 
jurisdiction would have been determined at the trial is equally 
unavailing, primarily because there was a trial and Kaufmann 
chose not to attend and offer evidence relating to personal 
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jurisdiction. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, it is 
respectfully submitted that the district court correctly denied 
Kaufmann's Motion for Continuance and properly entered a default 
judgment against Kaufmann for failure to appear at the trial. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Proceedings at the District Court. 
This case arose out of Kaufmann's attempts to purchase 
Sia Akhavan's ("Akhavan") fifty percent (50%) ownership of 
General Display Corporation, a local commercial sign company. In 
July of 1989, Kaufmann through his agents Robert Radcliffe and 
Emmanuel Floor, entered into negotiations with Akhavan to 
purchase his interest in General Display. Ultimately an 
agreement was reached and Kaufmann instructed Radcliffe to 
execute, on his behalf, an agreement to effectuate the purchase 
of Akhavan's shares in General Display Corporation. Kaufmann 
eventually breached that agreement by failing to pay Akhavan the 
consideration set forth in the agreement. 
This case was commenced by Radcliffe as an action for 
damages relating to the sale of General Display Corporation 
against Akhavan, Joel LaSalle, and General Display Corporation. 
Akhavan responded by filing an Answer and Counterclaim against 
Radcliffe, Republic International Corporation and Kaufmann. 
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Akhavan, prior to the trial, settled his claims against Radcliffe 
and Republic and the only outstanding claims were against 
Kaufmann. 
To attain service of process over Kaufmann, a resident 
of Switzerland, Letters Rogatory were issued from the United 
States and served upon Kaufmann in Switzerland. Kaufmann failed 
to answer in the requisite time period and a default judgment was 
entered against him. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, 
Akhavan agreed to set aside the default judgment and Kaufmann 
agreed that service of process was proper, but preserved his 
personal jurisdiction objections and subsequently raised that 
issue in a Motion to Dismiss. Kaufmann's Motion to Dismiss was 
submitted to the court after oral argument and upon the 
affidavits and memoranda of the parties. The district court 
denied Kaufmannfs Motion to Dismiss, finding that Kaufmann's 
extensive contacts with Akhavan within the State of Utah, all of 
which related directly to the transaction, were sufficient for 
the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Kaufmann. 
After discovery was completed, the trial court set the 
case for trial on March 24, 1992. Kaufmann then filed a Motion 
for continuance on the grounds that one of the associates 
representing him had a conflicting trial schedule during the week 
of March 24, 1992. The court granted Kaufmannfs Motion for 
Continuance and reset the trial for July 7, 1992. On June 17, 
1992, less than a month before trial, Kaufmann's attorneys moved 
for leave to withdraw as counsel for Kaufmann. Kaufmannfs 
5 
counsel attempted to withdraw from the case because they had not 
been paid legal fees, a fact which they apparently had known for 
some time. The trial court denied Kaufmannfs counsel's Motion to 
Withdraw because it would disrupt the scheduled trial. Kaufmann 
then hired counsel to file, on July 2, 1992, a Motion for 
Continuance of Trial which the court denied. Neither Kaufmann 
nor his counsel appeared at the scheduled trial on July 7, 1992 
and the court entered a default judgment against Kaufmann. It is 
from the denial of Kaufmann's Motion for Continuance and entry of 
default that Kaufmann is appealing. 
B. Objection to Kaufmann's Statement of Facts. 
Akhavan objects to the following factual statements 
contained in Kaufmann's Brief: 
1. Akhavan and Radcliffe Affidavits. 
Contrary to Kaufmann's contention, Radcliffe's 
Affidavit, 5 9 does not dispute Akhavan's Affidavit, f 13, 
wherein Akhavan contended that on August 12, 1989, Akhavan 
attended a meeting with Kaufmann, Radcliffe and Floor. In fact, 
Radcliffe's affidavit supports this fact. [Compare R. 195-96 
with 267]. 
Radcliffe's Affidavit, 5 19 does not dispute the facts 
set forth in Akhavan's Affidavit, 5 14, wherein Akhavan claims 
that "on or about August 17, 1989, Kaufmann invited LaSalle and 
myself to a meeting with F.N. Wolf & Company . . . ." In fact, 
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Radcliffe's affidavit confirms this meeting. [Compare R. 267 
with 196]. 
C. Akhavan's Statement of Facts. 
Kaufmannfs Motion for Continuance 
1. This action was originally filed on or about 
January 23, 1990. [R. 0002]. Appellee Akhavan was named in the 
initial action. Subsequently, on or about February 13, 1990, 
Akhavan filed his Answer and Counterclaim against, among others, 
Kaufmann. [R. 0015]. 
2. By notice dated December 11, 1991, Judge Sawaya set 
the trial date for March 24, 1992. [R. 0892]. On or about 
January 8, 1992, Kaufmann filed a motion for continuance of the 
trial date on the grounds that an associate at the firm of 
Metzger, Gordon, Scully & Mortimer had a conflicting trial 
schedule for that week. [R. 0898]. 
3. By Minute Order dated February 5, 1992, the court 
granted Kaufmann's motion for continuance and on February 10, 
1992, the district court set the new trial for July 7, 1992. [R. 
0905, 0929]. 
4. On June 17, 1992, less than a month before trial, 
Metzger, Gordon, Scully & Mortimer and LeslieAnn Haacke, counsel 
for Kaufmann, filed a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel. 
[R. 0959]. The motion was sought primarily on the grounds that 
Kaufmann had not paid his legal fees. [R. 0960]. Further, the 
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motion stated that Kaufmann had been informed of his counself s 
withdrawal and had stated that he did not intend to appear at 
trial nor would any counsel appear on his behalf. [R. 0961]. 
5. On June 25, 1992, Akhavan filed a memorandum in 
opposition to Kaufmann1s counselfs motion to withdraw. [R. 
0975]. 
6. On July 1, 1992, Jeff Bloom, Kaufmann1s counsel, 
faxed a letter to Judge Sawaya stating that Kaufmann had been 
informed that if he did not appear at trial then a default 
judgment would be entered against him. [R. 1015]. 
7. On July 2, 1992, making a special appearance on 
Kaufmannfs behalf, Paul M. Durham, filed a motion for continuance 
of trial. [R. 0979]. The court denied Kaufmann's motion. [R. 
1038] . 
8. After the trial on July 7, 1992, which Kaufmann and 
counsel failed to attend, Judge Sawaya, by Minute Entry dated 
July 8, 1992, entered default against Kaufmann and awarded 
Akhavan damages. [R. 1038]. The Default Order and Judgment and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law consistent with the 
judge's minute entry were filed and signed on July 16, 1992. [R. 
1042, 1050]. 
Personal Jurisdiction 
9. In Kaufmann's memorandum in support of his Motion 
to Dismiss, Kaufmann argued that he made "occasional visits" to 
Utah for business. [R. 0549]. Indeed, in Akhavan's affidavit, 
Akhavan testified that he met with Kaufmann in connection with 
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his sale of General Display stock at least six times [R. 0585], 
including an August 12, 1989 meeting involving Kaufmann, Akhavan, 
LaSalle, Floor and Radcliffe [R. 0587], and an August 17, 1989 
meeting with Kaufmann, Akhavan, LaSalle and F.N. Wolfe & Co., a 
New York based securities underwriter [R. 0587]. These meetings 
are confirmed by Radcliffe in his affidavit. [R. 0195-96]. 
10. In his affidavit, Radcliffe also admitted that Kaufmann 
was assisting in providing financing to the merged 
Bristol/General Display company. [R. 0199]. Radcliffe also 
refers to another meeting involving himself, Kaufmann and Akhavan 
on or about October 24, 1989. [R. 0200]. All of these meetings 
took place in Utah and related directly to the transaction 
resulting in this lawsuit. [R. 0583-92]. 
11. Kaufmann never denied Akhavanfs allegation that 
Kaufmann had visited General Display during the course of the 
negotiations. [R. 0575]. In fact, in his response to Akhavan's 
memorandum in opposition to Kaufmann's Motion to Dismiss, 
Kaufmann admits that he made brief visits to Utah as an 
investment banker looking into this transaction. [R. 0641]. 
12. During the relevant time period, Kaufmann had an 
office in Utah at Republic International. In his November 16, 
1990 affidavit, Kaufmann himself states that "on occasional 
visits to Utah" he had been given office space at Republic. [R. 
0526]. Radcliffe confirmed this in his affidavit which states 
that Republic International made an office available to Kaufmann 
on his business trips to Utah. [R. 0195]. In fact, Akhavan met 
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with Kaufmann at his office at Republic in connection with this 
transaction. [R. 0265, 0585]. 
13. Kaufmann also visited General Display and informed 
the employees that he would have General Display "running like a 
Swiss watch." [R. 621-22, 625-26, 629-30]. 
14. Kaufmann was formerly the vice president and 
treasurer of Republic International, which was involved in this 
transaction. [R. 0572]. Despite the fact that Kaufmann resigned 
in 1988, he continued to be a financial adviser to Republic, 
according to Republic's March 23, 1990 S-l Registration 
Statement. [R. 0574]. During the negotiations with Akhavan, 
Kaufmann had signature authority on various Republic checking 
accounts. [Depo. of Jay Hansen, p. 14; R. 0574]. 
15. On October 6, 1989, Kaufmann bought a home in the 
Pepperwood Subdivision of Salt Lake County, which was 
subsequently conveyed to his wife. [R. 0572]. Kaufmann 
confirmed this in response to Akhavan!s memorandum in opposition 
to Kaufmann's Motion to Dismiss. [R. 0639]. In addition, in 
connection with his involvement with a Utah corporation, Republic 
International, Kaufmann's address is listed with the Utah 
Department of Corporations as 5292 South 3 00 West, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. [R. 0572]. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
KAUFMANN'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL. 
Under Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
a trial court has substantial discretion in deciding whether to 
grant a party a continuance. Christensen v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 
1375, 1377 (Utah 1988); Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309, 310 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). A district court's decision with respect 
to deciding whether to grant a continuance will not be disturbed 
on appeal unless it is shown that it has acted unreasonably and 
abused its discretion. Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d at 311; Hardy 
v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 925-26 (Utah App. 1989) [emphasis added]. 
It is well settled law in the State of Utah that the abuse of 
discretion standard with respect to motions for continuance is 
determined by whether the court's discretion was abused by 
"acting unreasonably." See Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d at 311; 
Christensen v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d at 1317. 
Kaufmann ignores the standard set forth by the Utah 
case law and instead attempts to argue the abuse of discretion 
standard under the Colorado case law "weighing the rights of the 
parties." Kaufmann's obvious departure and ignorance of 
unequivocal Utah law demonstrates his implicit concurrence that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Kaufmann1s Motion for Continuance. 
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In this case, Kaufmann was granted a continuance from a 
March 24, 1992 trial date because his counsel had a conflict with 
the scheduled date. Kaufmann's second motion for a continuance, 
made five (5) days prior to trial, was based solely upon the fact 
that the same attorney that had a conflict with the March 24th 
trial date now was not being paid by Kaufmann and wanted to 
withdraw from the case. 
Since February 10, 1992, Kaufmann and his counsel were 
aware that the trial was scheduled for July 7, 1992, yet neither 
Kaufmann nor his counsel informed the court until mid June, 1992 
that Kaufmann was not paying his attorney, that his attorney 
would not attend trial, and that Kaufmann could not attend the 
July 7th trial because of financial reasons. Why Kaufmann and 
his counsel waited five months before notifying the court that 
they would be unable to proceed to trial is left only to one's 
imagination, the record does not contain any justification. More 
importantly, the fact that Kaufmann never intended to attend the 
July 7th trial [R. 960,1015-16], demonstrates his lack of 
justification. 
What is not left to the imagination, however, is the 
fact that Defendant cannot use his counsel to obtain a 
continuance in the first instance (i.e. through conflict with the 
trial dates), then use the fact that he has not paid that same 
counsel, thereby forcing his counsel to file a motion to 
withdraw, to obtain a continuance in the second instance. To 
allow such conduct would permit a defendant to avoid ever having 
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to try the case by tactically manipulating his counsel to obtain 
continuances. 
The facts of this case are very similar to those in 
Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)- In Hill v. 
Dickerson, Hill moved for a continuance of the trial two days 
before the trial, on the grounds that her expert witness could 
not testify. The trial court granted the continuance and, after 
the court later ruled on a motion-in-limine excluding certain 
witnesses from testifying on behalf of Hill, Hill filed a second 
motion for continuance. The court denied that second request for 
a continuance and the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial 
court's ruling and found that it did not abuse its discretion in 
stating: 
In the case at bar, Hill has failed to 
demonstrate that the district court's action in 
denying her oral motion for a continuance in 
August, 1991, was an unreasonable action by the 
district court meriting reversal as an abuse of 
discretion. To the contrary, the fact that the 
district court had already granted Hill one 
continuance in April weighs heavily in favor of 
the court's decision. Moreover, Hill's second 
request for continuance was solely due to her 
own failure to obtain and designate a new 
expert witness in a timely manner. Under such 
circumstances, we find no abuse in the district 
court's denial of Hill's oral motion in August. 
[Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d at 311]. 
In this case, like the facts in Hill v. Dickerson, 
Kaufmann was granted a motion for a continuance because of his 
counsel's conflict in scheduling, and the second request for 
continuance was due solely to Kaufmann's failure to either pay 
his attorney or retain new counsel in a timely manner. 
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Given that Kaufmann was already granted one 
continuance, and the fact that he was aware of the pending trial 
date for five months without taking any action either to pay his 
attorney, prepare for trial, find alternative counsel, or make 
travel arrangements for trial, it cannot be said that the trial 
court acted unreasonably in denying Kaufmann's second motion for 
a continuance. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ENTERING A 
DEFAULT AGAINST KAUFMANN. 
Rule 55(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that "when a party against whom a judgment or 
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise 
defend . . . the clerk shall enter his default." In this case, 
it is undisputed that Kaufmann did not appear and defend himself 
at the scheduled trial. Moreover, Kaufmann admits on p. 37 of 
his brief that he was aware that the court had ordered both him 
and his counsel to appear at trial or a default would be entered. 
The court specifically entered the default for Kaufmann's failure 
to appear and defend himself at the trial, not, as Kaufmann 
contends, because he failed to attend a pretrial conference. 
Given that Rule 55(a)(1) allows a default to be granted if a 
party fails to defend, the fact that Kaufmann did not show up at 
trial clearly gave the trial court abundant justification in 
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entering the default of Kaufmann and taking the judgment against 
him. 
Under Rule 55(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
a default judgment may only be set aside in accordance with Rule 
60(b). Caulder Bros. Co. v. Anderson. 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982); 
Himmeca Mutual Ins. Co. v. Shettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). A trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a 
motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) and its 
determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion. Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Kaufmann has failed to comply with Rule 55(c) of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure by failing to file a motion for relief from a 
default judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b), as required by Rule 
55(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The appeal of a 
default judgment is established not from the granting of the 
default judgment, but, under Rule 55(c), from the failure to set 
aside a default judgment. 
There is no question but that the court had adequate 
justification to enter a default judgment against Kaufmann for 
his failure to appear and defend himself at the scheduled trial 
on July 7, 1992. Furthermore, the fact that Kaufmann failed to 
file the requisite Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the default 
judgment, but instead appealed directly from the entry of 
default, prevents him from having standing to appeal that issue. 
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C. THE TRIAL COURT HAD PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER KAUFMANN, 
Kaufmann does not question whether the trial court had 
proper personal jurisdiction over him, but instead uses personal 
jurisdiction to improperly argue that the court abused its 
discretion by failing to grant his request for a continuance and 
allowing him an evidentiary hearing on the personal jurisdiction 
issue. Kaufmann1s claim that he was prejudiced because of the 
court's refusal to allow him an evidentiary hearing on the 
personal jurisdiction issue is unavailing because it completely 
ignores the fact that Kaufmann had an opportunity to present 
evidence at the trial, but refused to attend the trial. More 
importantly, there is no evidence on the record whatsoever that 
Kaufmann ever made a request for an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of personal jurisdiction either in his original motion to 
dismiss or in his second motion for a continuance. 
It is respectfully submitted that by failing to attend 
trial or to make a specific motion for an evidentiary hearing 
with respect to personal jurisdiction, Kaufmann waives any claim 
he may have that the court erred in not granting him an 
evidentiary hearing with respect to its claim of personal 
jurisdiction. However, if this court determines that the lack of 
an evidentiary hearing, regardless of whether it was because of 
Kaufmann's own actions, is relevant in determining whether the 
court should have granted Kaufmann's Motion for Continuance, 
Akhavan hereby submits that the facts as submitted by both 
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Kaufmann and Akhavan are sufficient to justify the district 
court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Kaufmann. 
Under Utah's long arm jurisdiction statute, a person 
submits himself to the jurisdiction of the courts in Utah "as to 
any claim arising from: (1) the transaction of any business 
within the state; or (2) the causing of any injury within the 
state whether tortious or by breach of warranty . . . "• Utah 
Code Ann, § 78-27-24 (1991). The undisputed facts as set forth 
in the affidavits on record establish that Kaufmann purposely 
visited the State of Utah on at least three (3) occasions to 
participate in negotiations relating to the Akhavan sale of 
General Display stock to Kaufmann. This clearly brings Kaufmann 
under § 78-27-24(1) "the transaction of any business within the 
state" and subjects him to jurisdiction under the long arm 
statute. Furthermore, the fact that Kaufmann caused Akhavan 
injury within the state brings him within § 78-27-24 of the long 
arm statute. The only question is whether exercising 
jurisdiction under the long arm statute over Kaufmann is within 
the due process requirements of the 14th Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. 
Due process requires that before a court can exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident, the non-resident 
defendant must have purposefully established minimum contacts 
within the forum state such that the defendant could reasonably 
anticipate being held to court there. Bradford v. Nagle, 763 
P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 1988) (citing Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 
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U.S. 462, 476 (1985)). The focus of the inquiry should also 
involve the interrelationship of the defendant, the forum and the 
litigation to determine "whether the cause of action arises out 
of or has substantial connection with the activity . . . " 
Bradford. 763 P.2d at 794 (quoting Syneraenics v. Marathon 
Ranching Co.. 702 P.d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985). 
In this case, the evidence undisputed by Kaufmann is 
that Kaufmann purposefully met with Akhavan in Utah on at least 
three separate occasions to conduct business relating directly to 
the transaction the subject of this litigation. Therefore, the 
interrelationship of the defendant, the forum and the litigation 
are substantial. In the affidavit of Radcliffe, filed in support 
of Kaufmann's motion to dismiss, it details those three meetings 
and their direct relationship to the transaction. 
In Burt Drilling. Inc. v. Portadrill. 608 P.2d 244 
(Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court held that a defendant's 
contracting with a Utah corporation was sufficient to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. In this regard, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
The allegations of plaintiff's complaint 
show that their claims arise out of defendant's 
contacts with this state, which were: (1) 
defendant purposely contracted with a resident 
of this state, knowing it was a resident, and 
(2) defendant purposely undertook to supply 
goods to that resident reasonably knowing or 
anticipating that those goods would be used in 
this state. . . . Defendant's actions were 
purposeful, and with a view to derive 
substantial economic benefit from the 
plaintiff. . . . By these acts, defendant has 
submitted itself to this jurisdiction to answer 
for any claims arising out of those actions. 
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Burt Drilling, Inc., 608 P.2d at 247. 
Furthermore, Kaufmann1s reliance upon Anderson v. 
American Society of Plastic Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 
1990) is without merit. The court in Anderson specifically holds 
that if an evidentiary hearing is not held, then the plaintiff 
must prove jurisdiction at the trial. In this regard, the court 
states: 
Unless an evidentiary hearing is held, the 
plaintiff must prove jurisdiction by trial by a 
preponderance of the evidence after making a 
prima facie showing before trial. 
Anderson 807 P.2d at 827. 
In this case, Akhavan made a prima facie showing that 
personal jurisdiction over Kaufmann was proper. Despite 
Kaufmann's claims to the contrary, a trial was held in this 
matter where Akhavan put forth undisputed evidence to establish 
jurisdiction over Kaufmann. See Addendum "G" to Kaufmann's brief 
and the facts set forth on page 32-33 of Kaufmann's brief. At 
the trial, Akhavan put forth competent evidence that the district 
court properly exercised jurisdiction over Kaufmann. At the 
trial, as the transcript shows (Addendum "G"), Akhavan set forth 
in detail his meetings with Kaufmann, all of which took place in 
Utah and all of which related directly to the transactions 
subject of this lawsuit. Kaufmann's claim that he was denied an 
evidentiary hearing is completely without merit. Kaufmann not 
only never requested an evidentiary hearing, but was given an 
opportunity at the trial to present evidence to support his 
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position that the district court could not exercise personal 
jurisdiction over him. Kaufmann instead chose not to attend the 
trial and this court should affirm the judgment of the district 
court• 
CONCLUSION 
The district court acted reasonably in denying 
Kaufmann1s second request for continuance of trial and entering a 
default judgment against Kaufmann for his failure to attend the 
trial and defend himself. Kaufmann has not set forth any facts 
to show that the trial court abused its discretion by acting 
unreasonably. Instead, Kaufmann attempts to divert this courtfs 
attention from established Utah case law and interpose the 
standard adopted by a neighboring jurisdiction and, in so doing, 
raise arguments relating to personal jurisdiction which are not 
properly before this court. Kaufmann was given an opportunity 
for an evidentiary hearing with respect to his personal 
jurisdiction issue, but failed to attend such hearing. For all 
the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that this 
court affirm the district court's judgment against Kaufmann in 
favor of Akhavan. / 
. \ ^ 
DATED this O day of May, 1993. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
/ A A A ^ 
DjOUGLAi^ H. HOLBROOK 
A t t o r n e y s f o r Counterc la imant 
and A p p e l l e e S i a Akhavan 
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